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Management Summary 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that stock markets are price efficient, 
meaning that in an efficient capital market, security prices fully reflect available 
information and no investor can make abnormal profit out of it. While there is 
substantial empirical evidence supporting the EMH, many still question its validity. 
Proponents of the price-earnings (P/E) ratio hypothesis claim that low P/E stocks tend 
to outperform high P/E stocks. Moreover, the returns of low P/E stocks tend to be larger 
than warranted by their underlying risks. This conclusion is difficult to reconcile with 
the efficient market hypothesis and is therefore often referred to as efficient market 
anomaly. The goal of this paper is to determine whether low P/E ratio stocks outperform 
high P/E ratio stocks (which is formally called the price/earnings ratio hypothesis) in the 
Swiss stock market by considering data spanning from 2005 to 2015. Moreover, this 
thesis intends to prove that low P/E portfolios are able to generate excess returns 
compared to the market and to investigate the extent to which an abnormal return can be 
generated by investing in the portfolio with the lowest price/earnings ratio (in terms of 
the CAPM). For any given year under consideration, four portfolios consisting of 25 
stocks with similar P/E ratios were formed. Each of these portfolios can be seen as a 
mutual fund having a strategy of purchasing securities in the given P/E quartile on 
January 1, holding the portfolio for one year, and then liquidating and reinvesting the 
proceeds in the same quartile portfolio (on January 1) in the following year. The 
research is split into two parts: In a first step, the returns are compared on a absolute 
performance basis, whereas the second part adjusts the returns to their corresponding 
risks and subsequently splits the results into a pre- and post-financial crisis section. 
During the 11-year period under investigation (2005–2015) the low P/E portfolios 
earned higher average absolute and risk-adjusted rates of return (considering total- and 
systematic risk) than the high P/E portfolios. Furthermore, low P/E portfolios were able 
to generate significant excess returns compared to the market. While the price/earnings 
ratio hypothesis is not fully confirmed by the pre-financial crisis section, the post-
financial crisis section does underline the higher absolute and risk-adjusted returns of 
the low P/E portfolios. Nonetheless, the low P/E portfolios managed to outperform the 
market significantly in both sections. In conclusion, the “P/E effect” seemed to exist for 
stocks within the Swiss Performance Index during the period 2005-2015, and therefore 
the price/earnings ratio hypothesis may be considered as validated. Furthermore, the 
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findings of this paper suggest that P/E ratio information was not “fully reflected” in 
security prices as postulated by the efficient market hypothesis. Further research could 
apply other risk-based models, such as multifactor asset pricing models, to verify if the 
derivations from CAPM are truly due to mispriced securities or simply a result of a 
failed risk adjustment procedure of CAPM. 
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1 Introduction 
The investment into stocks was bound to be a disorganized activity until the crash of the 
stock market in 1929. Aiming to tackle this problem, Columbia Business School 
professors Benjamin Graham and David Dodd started to create a robust framework for 
stock market investments. Graham and Dodd (1934) developed a few basic principles to 
analyze a company’s fundamentals, and established a concept of value investing and 
security analysis in their famous work called Security Analysis. Value investors invest 
in stocks that are trading below their intrinsic value. The difference between a stock’s 
intrinsic value (i.e., price a well informed investor would pay) and the market value is 
called the margin of safety. The higher the margin of safety, the lower is the chance of 
losing money with an investment. Value strategies call for investing in companies 
which have low prices relative earnings, dividends, book assets or other measures of 
value (Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1994). In the past decades, many academics and 
practitioners have shown a great interest for testing the performance of the so-called 
value strategies. 
Different ratios, used as valuation measures, have been examined to determine 
whether value stocks are able to outperform growth stocks (see Basu, 1977; Banz, 1981; 
Fama and French, 1988, 1992; Chan et al., 1991; Lakonishok et al., 1994; Hejazi and 
Oskouei, 2007; Abhyankar et al., 2008; Larkin, 2009). 
A substantial part of the academic literature identifies extensive evidence that 
value strategies generate excess returns. A distinctive difference between the returns of 
value portfolios and growth portfolios has been recognized across various time periods 
and in several equity markets around the world. More precisely value stocks or stocks 
with low ratios of market-to-book (MB), price-to-earnings (PE), or price-to-cash flow 
(PCF) earn higher average returns than growth stocks, meaning stocks with high 
corresponding ratios (e.g. Rosenberg et al., 1985; Chan et al., 1991; Fama and French, 
1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994). 
Whereas studies were initially limited to US stock market data, growing 
international evidence also underpinned the existence of a value premium (see Chan et 
al., 1991, 1993; Capaul et al., 1993; Fama and French, 1998). While there is some 
agreement that value strategies work, there are still considerable debates about the 
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reasons behind the value premium that is observed. Existing literature mainly 
distinguishes between risk-based and behavioral-based explanations. 
On the one hand De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Haugen (1995) argue that 
value strategies might work because they are different than the naive strategies followed 
by other investors. These naive strategies might range from extrapolating past earnings 
growth into the future and following a trend in stock prices to overreacting to certain 
news; some simply equate a good investment with a well-run company without 
considering the price. Regardless of the reason, some investors tend to falsely put their 
focus on stocks that have done very well in the past. As a result, these ‘glamor stocks’ 
immediately become overpriced. Similarly, investors may overreact to stocks that have 
done very badly by overselling them, which results in these out-of-favor value stocks 
becoming underpriced.  
Contrarian (value) investors go against the strategies of naive investors. They 
invest disproportionately in out-of-favor stocks because the stocks offer good 
investment opportunities, and they underinvest in stocks that are overpriced. This can be 
seen as one reason why they outperform the market (Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1994). 
On the other hand, Fama and French (1992) and Ball and Kothari (1989) argue 
that the reason why value strategies work might be that they are fundamentally riskier. 
Particularly traders investing in value stocks such as high book-to-market stocks, tend 
to bear higher fundamental risk. In other words, their higher-than-average returns 
simply compensate for this extra risk. Whether value strategies work because they are 
contrarian to naive strategies or because they are fundamentally riskier, this remains a 
much-debated issue. 
Furthermore, the value premium can also be associated with survivorship bias 
(Kothari, Shanken, & Sloan, 1995) and data snooping biases (Lo & MacKinlay, 1990). 
The assumption that stocks with low ratios of market-to-book, price-to-earnings, 
or price-to-cash flow outperform stocks with high corresponding ratios, even if returns 
are adjusted for portfolio beta, is quite contradictory to the efficient market hypothesis 
and is therefore often referred to as efficient market anomaly. Ultimately, this would 
confirm that the market systematically mis-prices stocks according to these ratios. This 
would be an extremely disturbing conclusion to many, because any information that 
could be used to predict stock performance should already be reflected in the stock 
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price, and therefore a relationship between these ratios and the subsequent returns 
should not exist if the market is efficient. 
To the best of my knowledge, no attempt has been made thus far to examine the 
well-known market anomaly of the “P/E effect” in the Swiss stock market. Against this 
background, the goal of this Bachelor’s thesis is to determine whether low P/E ratio 
stocks outperform high P/E ratio stocks (which is formally called the price/earnings 
ratio hypothesis) in the Swiss stock market by considering data spanning from 2005 to 
2015. Above all, this paper aims to review the validity of the price/earnings ratio 
hypothesis in the 21st Century in a persistent low- or zero-interest environment and in a 
period of slow economic growth. Moreover, this thesis intends to prove that low P/E 
portfolios are able to generate excess returns compared to the market and to investigate 
the extent to which an abnormal return can be generated by investing in the portfolio 
with the lowest price/earnings ratio (in terms of the CAPM). 
This paper is organized as follows: Firstly, certain fundamentals of the P/E ratio 
and the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) are described. In the second part, the 
existing literature related to this topic is analyzed and discussed. This section is split 
into two parts: In a first step, the focus is on research results within the American 
market, in a second step, findings for the rest of the world are discussed. Next, the data 
set produced for this thesis and the research methodology is explained in detail. The 
data set is analyzed and findings are presented and discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
Absolute performance figures are compared, multiple risk-adjusted performance 
measures within the CAPM are calculated and the accuracy of the hypothesis is closely 
examined. The paper concludes by a summary of the findings and some final thoughts 
on the issue. 
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2 Theoretical Background 
To a better understanding of the interdependencies and the further steps in this paper, 
certain essentials are outlined. 
 
2.1 Fundamentals of the P/E Ratio  
Fundamental analysts use models to uncover mispriced securities. In practice, these 
models estimate the fair market value of a corporation’s stock from observable market 
data and from the financial statements of the firm and its competitors. These valuation 
models differ in the specific data they use, but most of them use the notion of valuation 
by comparables: They look at the relationship between price and various determinants 
of value for similar firms and then extrapolate that relationship to the firm in question 
(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2013, p. 406). The price/earnings ratio, commonly called the 
P/E ratio, is probably the most widely used measure of valuation amongst fundamental 
analysts and investment advisory services. It is simply calculated by dividing the current 
market price of the stock by the latest twelfth-month earnings and indicates how much a 
stock purchaser is willing to pay per dollar of the past earnings. 
Although focusing on the balance sheet provides useful information about a 
firm’s liquidation value or its replacement costs, the analysts usually must turn to 
quantitative models to estimate the value of a common stock based on expected future 
cash flows. Mispriced securities are traded below their intrinsic values – so if the stock 
is underpriced compared to its intrinsic value, it provides more than a fair rate of return 
relative to its risk (in terms of CAPM it is a positive alpha stock). The intrinsic value of 
a stock is defined as the preset value of all cash payments to the investor in the stock, 
including dividends as well as the proceeds from the ultimate sale of the stock, 
discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted interest rate (k). The dividend discount 
model (DDM) uses only the expected future dividends to determine the intrinsic value 
of a stock. The reason is not that capital gains are ignored but it assumes that those 
capital gains will be determined by dividend forecasts at the time the stock is sold 
(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2013, p. 407-408). Due to the impossibility to forecast yearly 
dividends into the indefinite future, Gordon and Myron introduced some simplifying 
assumptions in their constant-growth DDM. It is assumed that dividends (D) are 
trending upwards at a stable growth rate (g). Ultimately, the intrinsic value is calculated 
as follows: 
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𝑉0 =
𝐷0(1 + 𝑔)
1 + 𝑘
+
𝐷0(1 + 𝑔)
2
(1 + 𝑘)2
+
𝐷0(1 + 𝑔)
3
(1 + 𝑘)3
+ ⋯ 
This equation can be simplified to 
𝑉0 =
𝐷0(1 + 𝑔)
𝑘 − 𝑔
=
𝐷1
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
If the constant-growth DDM formula, where g = ROE * b, is now accompanied 
with the definition of, b = proportion of retained earnings, and the fact that dividends 
equal the earnings that not reinvested in the firm, D1 = E1 * (1 – b), the P/E ratio can be 
formulated as follows: 
𝑃0
𝐸1
=
1 − 𝑏
𝑘 − (𝑅𝑂𝐸 ∗ 𝑏)
 
ROE = Return on equity 
b = plowback ratio (proportion of earnings that is not paid out as dividend) 
 
When the ROE increases, simultaneously the P/E ratio raises, as high ROE 
projects offer growth opportunities for the firm. Furthermore it can be verified that the 
P/E ratio increases for higher plowback, b, as long as ROE surpasses k. Thus, a firm is 
rewarded with a higher P/E ratio when good investment opportunities can be seen 
(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2013, p. 422). 
An important implication of any equity valuation model is that riskier stocks will 
have lower P/E ratios (holding all else equal). To make this clear, the above formula is 
simplified as follows: 
𝑃
𝐸
=
𝐷
𝐸
𝑘 − 𝑔
 
The lower P/E ratio is caused by the fact that riskier firms will have higher 
required rates of return (k). This also holds true beyond the constant-growth model, 
because any expected cash flow stream results in a lower present value for higher 
perceived risk. 
Even the evidence that many small, highly risky start-up companies have very 
high P/E ratios does not contradict our assumptions that P/E multiples should fall with 
risk. Instead, it is triggered by the market’s expectations of high growth rates. For this 
reason the assumption included holding all else equal (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2013, p. 
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425). Summarizing the above, the P/E ratio reflects investors’ expectations about the 
growth potential and risk of a stock. However, it is possible that growth prospects offset 
the risk and thus lead to higher P/E ratios. Ahmed (2003, p. 3) provides a fitting 
example to this debate: “The Internet companies that were so popular in the late 1990s 
were clearly extremely risky, but investors valued their potential and growth prospects 
very highly, and were willing to pay very high prices for these companies”. 
Programs as Bloomberg or Morningstar calculate the so-called trailing ratio. 
They consider the stock’s earnings of the previous twelve months, representing 
historical data. In this thesis, however, data for trailing P/E ratios have been 
implemented. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, this backward-looking ratio is 
based on the firms’ financial statement and should not be confused with the forward-
looking P/E multiple emerging from a dividend discount model.  
As we now know the P/E ratio indicates how much a stock purchaser is willing 
to pay per dollar of the past earnings. So, if the P/E ratio of a firm is low, earnings can 
be acquired more cheaply. They can be cheap because they are in serious financial 
trouble; a lower rate of return or a decrease in future cash flows is expected. In a 
minority of cases they may be unfairly under-rated. The latter are the ones that appeal to 
value investors, who invest in stocks trading below their intrinsic value. Value investor 
Warren Buffet, for example, has made a fortune with investing in underpriced stocks. 
 
Different P/E ratios among companies 
P/E ratios are affected by many factors, especially through interest rates and business 
cycles. This explains the considerable fluctuations in P/E ratios which companies and 
industries may experience across certain time periods. Jones (2000) finds a strong 
correlation between P/E ratio of individual stocks and the stock market as a whole; he 
shows that P/E ratios rise during bull markets and shrink during bear markets. 
Expectations of future performance can hence be established as a determinant of 
a company’s P/E ratio. Without doubt investor’s opinions about the future growth of a 
company’s earnings impacts its P/E ratio; as stock prices reflect market expectations 
about earnings. Nevertheless, interest rates should not be neglect, since they also play a 
vital role in the P/E ratios of a stock. In a scenario of declining interest rates, there is an 
enormous impact on the P/E ratios because future earnings need to be discounted with 
lower rates.   
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Drawbacks of the P/E Ratio 
Although the P/E ratio is very helpful for security analysis, it should be applied in a 
reasonable manner for any investment decisions. An investor, who reaches his 
investment decision based on only this single magic number, is likely to be disappointed 
by his performance.  
Ahmed (2003, p. 14) states that the P/E ratio’s value is important but limited. 
While the P/E ratio understates the price for companies with a lot of debt, the ratio can 
also dramatically overstate the price of companies that have lots of cash and no debt, 
since any cash a company is carrying beyond its operating needs could theoretically be 
paid out to shareholders. The true economic price of a company must therefore be 
adjusted by the according amount. This ambiguous nature of the price can make 
companies appear wrongly less attractive to value investors because of their higher P/E. 
 
2.2 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
Since the P/E ratio is often referred to as an anomaly of the efficient market hypothesis, 
it is certainly important to outline this well-debated issue in the financial world. The 
EMH essentially states that the stock market is price efficient and no investor can make 
abnormal profit
1
 out of it. More generally, any information that could be used to predict 
stock performance should already be reflected in stock prices. As soon as there is any 
information indicating that a stock is underpriced and is therefore offering a profit 
opportunity, investors immediately buy the stock and thus bid up its price to a fair level, 
where only ordinary rates of return can be expected. These “ordinary rates” are simply 
rates of return commensurate with the risk of the stock (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2013, 
p. 235). For this reason, the EMH predicts that fundamental analysis is useless. If the 
analyst relies on publicly available earnings and industry information, the evaluation of 
the firm’s prospects is not likely to be significantly more accurate than those of rival 
analysts. There are many well-informed firms conducting market research, what makes 
it very difficult to uncover data, which has not already been scrutinized by other 
analysts. Fundamental analysis is much more demanding than only identifying well-run 
firms with good prospects. Finding a good firm does not bring about any achievement if 
the rest of the market also knows the value of the firm. This is simply because the 
                                                 
1
 Abnormal profit it used to describe a return generated by a security/portfolio that is superior from the 
expected rate of return (estimated based on an asset pricing model). 
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investor is constrained to pay a high price for this firm and will therefore not realize a 
superior rate of return. In summary, it is not enough to identify good firms, since 
significant profit is only made if the own analysis is better than that of the competitors. 
The difficulty of this lies in the fact that the market reflects all commonly available 
information. On the other hand, poorly run firms can turn out to be bargains if they are 
not as bad as their stock prices indicate (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2013, p. 240). 
Proponents of the EMH believe that active management is largely wasted effort 
and unlikely to justify the expenses incurred. For that reason, they promote a passive 
investment strategy, which makes no endeavor to overperform the market, but rather 
establishes a well-diversified portfolio of securities without trying to find under- or 
overvalued stocks. The EMH does not exactly awaken enthusiasm in the community of 
professional active portfolio managers, who believe in rather inefficient markets (Bodie, 
Kane, & Marcus, 2013, p. 243). This assumption is supported by the fact that several 
easily accessible statistics, such as the P/E ratio or market capitalization, seem to predict 
abnormal risk-adjusted returns. Suchlike findings are difficult to reconcile with the 
efficient market hypothesis and are therefore often referred to as efficient market 
anomalies. The so-called “P/E effect” will be reviewed later in the historical overview. 
A difficulty in interpreting these abnormal risk-adjusted returns is that usually 
portfolio returns need to be adjusted for portfolio risk to evaluate the success of a 
strategy (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2013, p. 247). If CAPM
2
 is used to adjust portfolio 
returns for risk, ”inappropriate adjustments may lead to the conclusion that various 
portfolio strategies can generate superior returns, when in fact it simply is the risk 
adjustment procedure that has failed” (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2013, p. 247). To 
express it differently, tests of risk-adjusted returns are joint tests of the efficient market 
hypothesis and the risk adjustment procedure. If a portfolio strategy generates superior 
returns, it must be chosen between rejecting the EMH and rejecting the risk adjustment 
technique. Due to the fact that the risk adjustment technique is based on more-
questionable assumptions than the EMH, it is more likely to reject the adjustment 
procedure. Ultimately, drawing conclusions about market efficiency (Bodie, Kane, & 
Marcus, 2013, p. 247). 
 
                                                 
2
 See 4.4 Method of Analysis for a more detailed explanation of CAPM. 
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3 Historical Overview 
The historical overview is separated into two parts. Whereas the first part focuses on 
research results within the American market, the second part concentrates on findings in 
the rest of the world. 
 
3.1 The P/E Ratio and Stock Returns in the USA 
Previous empirical research has established a number of the so-called market anomalies, 
constituting the basis of value investing. Thus, multiple academic studies prove that low 
P/E ratio strategies have historically generated, on average, above-normal returns. 
Basu (1977) investigated the investment performance of common stocks in 
relation to their price/earnings ratios. His study covered NYSE listed companies, about 
500 stocks annually, over a 14-year period, from 1957 through 1971. Beginning at the 
end of 1956, he computed the P/E ratio of every sample security. The ratio was defined 
as follows: The numerator as market value of common stock (market price times 
number of shares outstanding) as of December 31 and the denominator as reported 
annual earnings available for common stockholders. These ratios were ranked and five 
portfolios were created. Basu computed the portfolios the P/E ratio as of December 31, 
although it is unlikely that investors would have access to the firm’s financial 
statements and exact earnings figures at that time. Even though several researchers 
indicate that the market reacts as though it possesses such information. Due to the fact 
that most of the firms release their financial reports within three months of the fiscal 
year-end, the portfolios were assumed to be purchased on the following April 1. He 
furthermore computed the monthly returns on each of these portfolios for the next 
twelve months assuming an equal initial investment in each security. This procedure 
was repeated on an annual basis on each April 1 from April 1957 to March 1971. 
Basically each of these portfolios can be seen as a mutual fund with the policy of 
acquiring securities in a given P/E class on April 1, holding them for one year, and then 
reinvesting the proceeds in the same class in the following year. To take into 
consideration both risk and return, he moreover applied Jensen’s alpha, Sharpe ratio and 
Treynor ratio to his data file. 
His findings are imposing. One million dollars invested in the lowest 
price/earnings ratio group would have increased to $8,282,000 with an average annual 
rate of return of 16.3% over the 14-year study period. Compared to an investment of 
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one million dollars in the highest price/earnings ratio, which would have increased to 
$3,473,000 with an annual rate of return of 9,3% over the same period, a huge 
difference can be observed. This higher return of the lowest P/E portfolio was not 
associated with a higher level of systematic risk, as Jensen’s measure indicates. The low 
P/E portfolio earned about 4,5% more per annum than implied by the level of risk, 
while the highest P/E portfolio earned 3% less per annum than implied by the level of 
risk. 
Basu’s research indicated that low P/E ratio portfolios earn superior risk-
adjusted returns, consequently proving the assertion of the P/E ratio hypothesis to be 
valid. Although the efficient market hypothesis denies the possibility of earning excess 
returns, due to the assumption that publicly available information is embedded in 
security prices; there seem to be delays in the adjustment process. These delays can be 
seen in the P/E ratios and offer opportunities for investors to earn abnormal returns. 
Absurdly, using a sample of NYSE firms, Banz (1981) documented that stocks 
of small firms (growth stocks) earned higher risk-adjusted returns than stocks of large 
firms (value stocks). Likewise, Reinganum (1981) also found abnormally large risk-
adjusted returns for small firms (growth stocks) in his sample of NYSE and AMEX 
stocks. The findings of Banz and Reinganum prove exactly the opposite of the P/E ratio 
hypothesis by showing that higher P/E ratios (growth stocks) tend to earn higher 
returns. 
Convinced of Basu’s findings, Ibbotson (1986) ranked all stocks listed on the 
NYSE according to price/earnings ratios at each year end from 1966 through 1983, and 
sorted them into deciles. The investment returns were measured for each year at the end 
of the year, over an 18-year period. His results show a compound annual return of 
14,08% for an investment in the group with the lowest price/earnings ratio. One million 
dollars invested would have increased to $12,220,000. Whereas one million dollars 
invested in the highest price/earnings ratio would only have increased to $2,810,000 
with a compound annual return of 5.58%. It should be taken into account that during the 
18-year period the compound annual returns for the NYSE and U.S. Treasury bills were 
8.6% and 7.4%, respectively. 
Oppenheimer (1984) scrutinized the investment performance of the low 
price/earnings ratio stock selection criteria developed by Benjamin Graham. His stock 
selection criteria called for the purchase of securities with an earnings-to-price ratio at 
least twice the AAA bond yield and total debt less than the companies’ book value. 
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Graham moreover advised that each security should be held for either two years, or until 
50% price appreciation occurred. Over the period 1974-1980 Oppenheimer screened the 
New York and American Stock Exchange to find securities for possible investments. 
His study reached the conclusion that an investor who had employed Graham’s “low 
price/earnings ratio” stock selection criteria in this period of time generated an average 
annual return of 38% in comparison to 14% per year from the market index.  
Following Basu’s footsteps, Jaffe et al. (1989) re-examined the effect of the P/E 
ratio in the US with a substantially longer sample period, 1956 – 1986. In contrast to 
Basu’s research, they also included companies with negative earnings arranging these 
into an own portfolio. Furthermore they ranked the stocks in total ten portfolios 
according their P/E ratio. These portfolios were then divided into five subgroups 
according to their size. This scenario was repeated on a yearly basis, per March 31. 
Jaffe et al. (1989) report significant P/E and size effects when estimated across all 
months during the test period. In all size groups, however, the lowest P/E portfolio 
produced highest return. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) had done similar research on this topic. They 
investigated the effects of price/earnings ratios on investment returns. The professors 
arranged all on the NYSE and the AMEX listed companies based on the price/earnings 
ratios and assorted the companies into deciles. The ratio for all the stocks was initially 
calculated on April 30, 1968, and new ratios were formed on each subsequent April 30. 
The period of studies ended on April 30, 1990. Equal investments were made in each 
stock and it was assumed that the portfolios were held for five years. Their analysis 
reveals an enormous difference between the highest and the lowest portfolio. While the 
average annual five-year investment return of the lowest price/earnings ratio was 19%, 
the portfolio with the highest price/earnings ratio only made 11,4%. Due to this yearly 
difference the divergence of the average cumulative five-year returns were immense. 
The portfolio with the highest ratio achieved a return of 71,7%, which is quite low 
compared to 138,8% of the highest price/earnings ratio. 
As can be seen in these studies, the P/E ratio anomaly, as has already been 
discussed, can offer potential strategies for investors to produce returns superior to 
many alternatives. One of the greatest investors advocates this strategy and even goes a 
step further. 
Dreman (1994) proposed that investors should ignore expensive professional 
investment advice and select stocks only based on low P/E ratios. His idea was that 
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these stocks may currently be unwanted, but if they provide strong finances, high yields, 
and good earnings records, they almost always do well. In Dreman’s analysis, a sample 
of 1,200 stocks, low P/E stocks outperformed high P/E stocks for the 20-year period 
through 1993. Whereas the lowest quintile produced an average annual rate of return of 
22,9%, the highest quintile returned 11,3% annually. Interestingly, the low P/E strategy 
showed low performance in turbulent markets as well as in periods of slow economic 
growth, Dreman concluded. Nevertheless he gave evidence that the stocks may perform 
well in a “full-blown” bear market due to the higher dividend yield. In summary, 
Dreman advises that the strategy should be used for a long time horizon, in good and 
bad market situations. 
 
3.2 The P/E Ratio and Stock Returns in the Rest of the World  
The research of Chisholm (1991) focused on price in relation to earnings and 
investment results for companies in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan. 
His study described the data record as consisting out of liquid, buyable companies. The 
data set was rated at the end of each year according to the price/earnings ratio and 
arranged into quintiles. The entire period of studies lasted 15 years, from the end of 
1974 until the end of 1989. The study assumed that the investment in every single stock 
is weighted equally and the shares are being sold after one-year holding period. The 
investment returns were displayed in USD. The most significant gap between the lowest 
price/earnings quintile and the highest quintile for the countries investigated was found 
in the United Kingdom. An annual compound return of 33% in comparison to 24.5% 
implied an excess return of 8,5%. UK was followed by France and Japan with an excess 
return of the lowest price/earnings quintile of 6,5% and 6%, respectively. Germany 
showed the smallest gap from the countries under investigation with 3,1% annually.  
Levis (1988) examined market size, P/E ratios, dividend yield and share prices 
in the United Kingdom. He was particularly interested in the connection between 
price/earnings ratio and the investment returns from 1961 to 1985. The companies of 
the London Share Price database, for which earnings information was accessible, were 
ranked according to their price/earnings ratios on each April 1 from 1961 to 1985 and 
separated into quintiles. Based on this data, annual investment returns and the 
cumulative value of £1 million invested at the beginning of the 24-year time period was 
calculated. As anticipated, the results proved that the lowest price/earnings ratio had the 
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highest average annual investment return. A yearly return of 17,76% and a cumulative 
value of £50,600,000 at March 1985 impressively demonstrated that it is worthwhile to 
invest along this strategy. During this timespan the market index generated an annual 
return of 12,48% and a cumulative value of £16,800,000 which is only slightly better 
than the quintile with the highest price/earnings ratio (10,8% / £11,700,000). 
Goodman and Peavy (1985) analyzed investment returns of stocks ranked 
according to price/earnings ratios within each stock’s respective industry. After dividing 
the companies up into more than hundred industries, the companies were sorted in 
quintiles within the industry. At every year-end this procedure was repeated. During the 
18 years period from the end of 1962 until the end of 1980, 2600 companies were 
investigated each year. Furthermore the study computed annual investment returns and 
the cumulative return for the five quintiles. Once again their results establish the highest 
returns of the lowest quintile. It has been identified that 23,61% average annual 
investment return compared to 5,42% in the highest price/earnings ratio can be 
achieved. Over the entire time horizon, the lowest P/E portfolio earned 2.8% more than 
suggested by systematic risk level, whereas the highest P/E portfolio earned 2.4% less 
than implied by its beta risk. Furthermore, one million dollars invested at the beginning 
of this 18 year period would have increased to $45,390,000. By investing in the second 
lowest quintile, the money would only have increased to $20,500,000. Fewest of all was 
generated by the highest price/earnings ratio quintile with $2,600,000. 
There is considerable evidence from this review that low P/E ratio strategies are 
able to outperform high P/E strategies (and in some cases also the market). This 
underlines the assertion of the existence of the so-called P/E effect. More precisely it 
demonstrates that value stocks, identified with the P/E ratio, are able to generate higher 
returns compared to growth stocks, even on a risk-adjusted basis. According to Dreman, 
low P/E strategies do not seem to work in turbulent markets nor in periods of slow 
economic growth. Therefore, above-normal returns in turbulent markets, as in the 
period under investigation, are questionable. 
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4 Data and Methodology 
The first section of this chapter starts with the procurement of the data. In a second step, 
a general description of the data is made. Since the analysis is carried out on the basis of 
equity portfolios, the third step accurately describes the portfolio formation process. 
After looking at the portfolio construction, section 4.4 defines the methodology for the 
performance evaluations. 
 
4.1 Data Base & Sample Selection Criteria 
The data used for the empirical analysis is drawn from Bloomberg. Since Bloomberg is 
a major provider of financial information, it can be assumed that the data is accurate. 
The database includes the market capitalizations, the P/E ratios and the monthly total 
returns of all companies listed to the SIX Swiss Exchange and included in the Swiss 
Performance Index (SPI). The time period examined lasts from January 2005 to 
December 2015. 
The relevant key figures under investigation are defined as follows:  
1) Market Capitalization: “HISTORICAL_MARKET_CAP” 
 Total market value of all of a company’s outstanding shares at period end 
in the fundamental currency: Shares outstanding * Last closing price 
2) Price/Earnings Ratio: “PE_RATIO” 
 Calculated as last price divided by trailing 12M EPS (P/E ratio is not 
computed if the EPS is negative) 
3) Monthly Total Returns: “CUMULATIVE_TOT_RETURN_GROSS_DVDS” 
 Total return for the holding period assuming dividends are reinvested at 
spot price (Gross dividends and no commissions) 
 
For any given year under consideration, the following criteria were used for the 
selection of sample firms: (i) the firm is traded on the SPI on December 30; (ii) the 
relevant market capitalization and P/E ratio data of the firm are available as of 
December 30. Thus, no consideration of firms displaying “N/A” for these two criteria, 
due to the uncertainty whether it is caused through a negative EPS or simply through 
missing data; and (iii) the monthly total returns are available for the respective fiscal 
year. Hence, in case of inaccessible data, the next lower capitalized firm replaces the 
firm concerned. 
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4.2 Data Description 
On average, every year between three and four companies have been excluded from the 
analysis due to missing or unavailable data. As described above, they were replaced 
with the next lower capitalized firms. It is worth mentioning that UBS AG was not 
considered from 2009-2011 and 2014 because of their immense losses during these 
periods. Throughout the entire period, UBS AG was the only excluded firm with a 
market capitalization of over 10 billion. In contrast, several firms with a market 
capitalization of over 1 billion were replaced due to missing data (2005: Pargesa 
Holding SA, SIG Comibloc Group AG and Dorma + Kaba Holding AG; 2006: Edmond 
de Rothschild Suisse SA and Basilea Pharmaceutica AG; 2007: Basilea Pharmaceutica 
AG, Speedel Holding AG and Merck Serono SA; 2008: BKW Energie AG, Basilea 
Pharmaceutica AG and Hiestand Holding AG; 2009: Basilea Pharmaceutica AG and 
Ciba Holding AG; 2010: Clariant AG, Petroplus Holdings AG and Rieter Holding AG; 
2011: Petroplus Holdings AG; 2012: EFG International AG and Synthes Inc; 2013: 
Romande Energie Holding SA; 2014: Basilea Pharmaceutica AG). 
 
4.3 Portfolio Formation 
Starting on December 30, 2004, the market capitalization of every sample security was 
computed. Since insiders and speculators are able to provoke enormous price 
fluctuations (with relatively little capital) in firms with low market capitalizations, only 
the 100 highest capitalized companies were taken into consideration. This reduces the 
number of outliers to a minimum and hence provides more accurate results. Likewise, 
as of December 30, the P/E ratio for each stock was computed. In a further step, the 
stocks were ranked from lowest to highest and four equal-sized portfolios, each 
containing 25 stocks, were formed. Contrary to Basu (1977), the ranking was conducted 
with the P/E ratio and not with its reciprocal, since no negative P/E ratios are 
considered. Furthermore, the monthly returns of the stocks were calculated for the next 
twelve months from January 2005 to December 2005. And finally, the monthly average 
returns (assuming equal weighting of the stocks within the portfolio) for each of the 
four P/E portfolios were computed for the entire fiscal year. 
Basu (1977) assumed the portfolios to be purchased on April 1 due to the 
unlikeliness of the investors having access to the firm’s financial statements and exact 
earnings figures on December 30. Although his approach is correct, Ball and Brown 
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(1968) have provided evidence that the market reacts as though it possess such 
information. They conclude that it seems rather improbable that unexpected earnings 
announcements would be so predominant to significantly change the portfolio grouping. 
For this reason, an equal initial investment in each security of the portfolios was 
assumed to be made on January 1 and held until December 31.  
This procedure was repeated annually on each January 1, resulting in 11 years 
(January 2005 - December 2015) of return data for each of the P/E portfolios. Every 
portfolio can be seen as a mutual fund having a strategy of purchasing securities in the 
given P/E quartile on January 1, holding the portfolio for one year, and then liquidating 
and reinvesting the proceeds in the same quartile portfolio (on January 1) in the 
following year. 
 
In order to obtain a better idea of the composition of the portfolios, every stock 
was classified into a sector. This was done according to the GICS sector (Global 
Industry Classification Standard) classification of Bloomberg. Figure 1 shows the 
yearly average sample for each of the four P/E portfolios (1 = lowest P/E, 2, 3 and 4 = 
highest P/E)
3
: 
 
Figure 1: Yearly average composition by sectors 
The financials, industrials and health care are strongly represented in the sample. 
The percentage of which each portfolio is composed of financial shares decreases 
steadily from portfolio 1 to 4. Likewise does the percentage of consumer discretionary 
shares. The opposite trend can be observed in the percentage of health care shares, 
                                                 
3
 See appendix for yearly sector classifications. 
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increasing from portfolio 1 to 4. Similarly, a slight growth in the percentage of industry 
shares is apparent from portfolio 1 to 4, with an exception in portfolio 4.  
Figure 2 depicts the median price/earnings ratio for each of the four P/E 
portfolios over the 11-year period ending December 31, 2015
4
: 
 
 Figure 2: Median price/earnings ratios of the four portfolios 
The lowest average yearly P/E ratio was 6.2 (portfolio 1) and the highest yearly 
average P/E ratio was 255.5 (portfolio 4), considering the eleven years observation 
period. Due to these apparent outliers, the standard deviations and the inter-quartile 
ranges of the P/E ratios were investigated and represented in table 1: 
 
Table 1: Statistics of the P/E portfolios 
The high standard deviation and inter-quartile range of portfolio 4 was primarily 
caused by Kuoni Reisen Holding AG (4362.5) and Adecco SA (960) in 2010. A 
comparably high P/E ratio was achieved by Von Roll Holding AG (853) in 2012. GAM 
Holding AG (0.96) and Rieter Holding AG (2.47) realized the lowest P/E ratios in 2010 
and in 2009, respectively. 
  
                                                 
4
 See appendix for yearly average P/E ratios. 
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4.4 Method of Analysis 
Absolute Performance Evaluation 
Firstly, the average returns per annum and the total returns for the 11-year holding 
period of the four portfolios were compared on an absolute performance level. These 
results were then compared to the returns of the Swiss Performance Index (SPI). 
This section derives the calculation of the past geometric returns (?̅?) of the 
portfolios and does not consider any associated risks. After computing the monthly 
returns for each of the four P/E portfolios, the yearly average returns were calculated in 
two steps: 
Step 1: Yearly return calculation from 2005-2011 
?̅?𝑝𝑦 =  ∏[1 + 𝑅𝑝𝑚]
12
𝑚=1
− 1 
where ?̅?𝑝𝑦 is the return on P/E portfolio p in year y, and 𝑅𝑝𝑚 is the monthly return 
 
Step 2: Yearly average return calculation 
?̅?𝑝  = √∏(1 + ?̅?𝑝𝑦)
11
𝑦=1
11
− 1 
where ?̅?𝑝 is the yearly geometric average return for portfolio p, and ?̅?𝑝𝑦 are the yearly 
returns from 2005-2015 
The same procedure was used for the yearly geometric average return of the SPI. 
In terms of the risk-free rate, the yearly average return of the 1-year CHF “Obligation 
der Eidgenossenschaft” from 2005 to 2015 was used. (Source: Swiss National Bank) 
 
Risk-adjusted Performance Evaluation 
Since performance evaluation only based on average returns is not very meaningful, 
returns must be adjusted for risk before they can be compared. Firstly, the total returns 
were compared to their corresponding total risk (𝜎p) and systematic risk (βp). To replace 
the two-parameter measure of performance (return and risk) with a single measure, 
which combines the two dimensions and adjusts for differences in risk, the Sharpe ratio, 
Treynor ratio and Jensen’s alpha were used. The investigated period of time was 
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enormously affected by the financial crisis of 2008, where the world experienced the 
biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression and stock prices dropped further 
than they had in a single year since the 1930s (Cheffins, 2009). Due to this momentous 
event, the investigation was subsequently split into a pre-financial crisis (2005-2007) 
and a post-financial crisis (2008-2015) section. No investigation was conducted during 
the financial crisis (2009-2012), since the timeframe was not suitable to make any 
meaningful assertions. 
This section on the one hand derives the figures needed for the risk-adjusted 
return evaluation and on the other hand explains the relevant risk-adjusted measures. 
Using the monthly returns for each of the four P/E portfolios, the yearly average returns 
were calculated differently than above: 
Step 1: Monthly average return calculation for 132 returns from 2005-2011
5
 
𝑅𝑝𝑚 =
𝑅𝑝𝑚(1) + 𝑅𝑝𝑚(2) + 𝑅𝑝𝑚(3)+ ⋯ + 𝑅𝑝𝑚(131)𝑅𝑝𝑚(132)
132
 
where 𝑅𝑝𝑚  is the monthly average return on P/E portfolio p, and 𝑅𝑝𝑚(𝑥)  are the 
monthly returns 
 
Step 2: Annualization of the monthly average return 
𝑅𝑝 = 𝑅𝑝𝑚 ∗ 12 
where 𝑅𝑝 is the is the yearly average return for portfolio p 
The yearly average return of the SPI was calculated equally
6
. For the risk-free 
rate, the monthly average return of the 1-year CHF “Obligation der Eidgenossenschaft” 
from 2005 to 2015 was used
7
. (Source: Swiss National Bank) 
  
                                                 
5
 𝑅𝑝𝑚 for the pre-fin. crisis (05-07) is limited to 36 monthly returns (𝑅𝑝𝑚(𝑥)) and divided by 36, 𝑅𝑝𝑚 for 
the post-fin. crisis (08-15) is limited to 96 monthly returns (𝑅𝑝𝑚(𝑥)) and divided by 96 
6
 The yearly average return of the SPI for the pre- & post-fin. crisis analysis was calculated as explained 
under footnote 5. 
7
 The risk-free rate for the pre- & post-fin. crisis period was limited to monthly average returns within 
their corresponding years.  
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Moreover, the standard deviation, variance and covariance needed to be 
annualized. This was done as follows: 
𝜎𝑝 = 𝜎𝑝𝑚 ∗ √12 
where 𝜎𝑝  is the yearly standard deviation/volatility for portfolio p, and 𝜎𝑝𝑚  is the 
monthly standard deviation 
 
𝜎2𝑝 = 𝜎
2
𝑝𝑚 ∗ 12 
where 𝜎2𝑝 is the yearly variance for portfolio p, and 𝜎
2
𝑝𝑚 is the monthly variance 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑝, 𝑅𝑚) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑝𝑚, 𝑅𝑚𝑚) ∗ 12 
where 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑝, 𝑅𝑚) is the yearly covariance of the portfolio p and the market m, and 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑝𝑚, 𝑅𝑚𝑚) is the monthly covariance between these two. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Treynor (1961), Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965) has provided a framework for a number of risk-adjusted 
performance measures for managed portfolios, three of which have been broadly 
adopted in the financial literature and are used in this paper. The Sharpe (1966) ratio is 
derived from the Capital Market Line, with the level of risk being measured by the 
standard deviation of portfolio returns. The Treynor (1966) ratio, where the level of risk 
is measured by the beta factor, and Jensen’s (1968) alpha, defined as the portfolio’s 
excess return over the required average return, are directly linked to the beta through the 
Security Market Line. 
The Sharpe ratio is the most commonly used risk-adjusted performance measure 
in the financial practice. It is calculated by subtracting the risk-free rate from the rate of 
return for a portfolio and dividing the result by the standard deviation of the portfolio 
returns. The standard deviation represents the total risk of a single asset or a portfolio. It 
includes unsystematic (diversifiable) risk, which to a large extent can be eliminated 
through diversification, and systematic (nondiversifiable) risk (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 
2013, p. 125): 
𝑆𝑝 =
𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓
𝜎𝑝
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where 
𝑅𝑝 = the yearly average return of portfolio p 
𝑅𝑓 = the yearly average risk-free rate of return 
𝜎𝑝 = the volatility of the excess return of portfolio p 
The Sharpe ratio reveals whether a portfolio’s returns are the outcome of a 
superior investment strategy or an outcome of excess risk. A greater Sharpe ratio 
indicates a better reward per unit of volatility, in other word, a more efficient portfolio. 
As noted above, Jensen’s alpha and the Treynor ratio use the Security Market 
line derived by Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). This line represents 
the expected total return of every security or portfolio p as a linear function of the return 
of the market portfolio m: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑝) = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑝[𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓] 
where 
𝐸(𝑅𝑝) = the expected return of portfolio p 
𝑅𝑓 = the risk-free rate of return 
𝑅𝑚 = the stock market return 
𝛽𝑝 = 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑝,𝑅𝑚)
𝜎2(𝑅𝑚)
 is the beta coefficient of portfolio p 
The beta factor is a measure of systematic (nondiversifiable) risk and describes 
how sensitive individual assets or portfolios react to fluctuations in the market or 
macro-economic factors (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2013, p. 149). Since in this paper 
each portfolio contains 25 stocks, unsystematic risk should be largely diversified away. 
It is therefore more suitable to compare average excess returns to nondiversifiable or 
systematic risk. There should be a positive correlation between nondiversifiable market 
risk and expected returns because investors require higher returns as a compensation for 
taking higher risks. 
Like Sharpe’s measure, the Treynor ratio gives excess return per unit of risk, but 
it uses systematic risk instead of total risk (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p. 822). 
𝑇𝑝 =
𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓
𝛽𝑝
 
where 𝛽𝑝 is the beta coefficient of portfolio p 
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The higher the Treynor ratio, the better is the reward per unit of market risk. 
Thus, a portfolio with a higher Treynor ratio implies a better risk-adjusted return than 
portfolios with a lower ratio. 
Jensen’s alpha measures the excess return on a portfolio over its theoretical 
expected return predicted by the CAPM given portfolio’s weighted beta and the average 
market risk premium. It is an absolute performance measure, meaning that it is 
measured in the same units as the return itself after the consideration for risk (Hübner, 
2005, p. 418). A positive value of the alpha signifies a superior performance of the 
portfolio. Correspondingly, a negative alpha stands for an underperformance in terms of 
expected return indicated by the CAPM. Jensen’s alpha is calculated as follows: 
𝛼𝑝 = 𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 − 𝛽𝑝[𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓] 
where 𝛼𝑝 is Jensen‘s alpha of portfolio p 
“If the CAPM holds and if markets are efficient, the alpha should not be 
statistically different from zero” (Hübner, 2005, p. 418). 
Empirical findings of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) prove that the 
alpha of the CAPM deviates statistically from zero. They concluded that missing risk 
factors are the source of deviations and therefore introduced additional factors to 
improve the results. Fama and French (1993) show evidence that extending the CAPM 
with two other factors related to the firm’s size and the firm’s book-to-market better 
explains variations in average returns across stocks. Likewise, several years later 
Carhart (1997) documents that an extension of Fama/French’s three-factor model with a 
fourth new momentum factor better explains the returns of mutual fund’s portfolios than 
the CAPM does. Nevertheless, this paper focuses on CAPM and does not take any of 
these multifactor asset pricing models into account. 
 
5 Empirical Research & Findings 
This chapter comprises a findings part and a discussion part. The findings are split into 
two parts: At first, the returns are compared on an absolute performance basis, whereas 
the second part adjusts the returns to their corresponding risks and subsequently splits 
the results into a pre- and post-financial crisis section. 
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5.1 Absolute Performance of the P/E Portfolios 
The highest and the lowest yearly returns were both achieved by portfolio 1. The 
highest return of 43,8% was realized in 2009 whereas the lowest return amounted  
-41.6% in 2008. The highest yearly return of portfolio 2 (39.4%) was achieved in 2009, 
whereas portfolio 3 (39.1%) and portfolio 4 (32.6%) reached their yearly highs in 2006 
and 2005, respectively. Similar to portfolio 1 the other three portfolios performed the 
worst in 2008. On the other hand, the market (SPI) reached its peak in 2005 with 35.6% 
and hit its low of -34.1% in 2008. Taking a closer look on the high point of portfolio 1 
in 2009, its highest monthly return of 23.6% was realized in April and was mainly 
caused by an 81.2% return of OC Oerlikon AG. On the other hand the low point of 
portfolio 1 in 2008 was attained in October (-19.4%) and was mainly due to a loss of  
-44.3% by Schmolz + Bickenbach AG. Likewise, portfolio 2 (-17,4%), 3 (-16.2%) and 
4 (-19.7%) attained their highest monthly losses in October 2008. 
Table 2 displays the yearly average returns of the four P/E portfolios (1 = lowest 
P/E, 2, 3 and 4 = highest P/E). The two low P/E portfolios, 1 and 2, earned on average 
11,7% and 10% per annum respectively over the 11-year period; Whereas the two 
higher P/E portfolios, 3 and 4, earned 9.5% and 4.7% per year. All of the four rates 
were above the yearly risk-free rate of 0.71 percent used in this analysis. During the 11-
year period, the annual investment return for the market was 7.2%. Only portfolio 4 
attained lower rates than one would earn investing in the SPI. In fact, table 2 indicates 
that the average annual rates of return decline as the P/E ratios of the portfolios grow. 
 
Table 2: Absolute performance of the P/E portfolios 
One million Swiss Francs invested in the lowest P/E portfolio over the 11-year 
study period would have increased to CHF 3’378’014. In comparison, an investment of 
one million Swiss Francs in the Swiss Performance Index (SPI) would have only 
increased to CHF 2’147’560. One million Swiss Francs invested in the highest and thus 
worst performing P/E portfolio would have increased merely to 1’659’219. 
 
1 (lowest) 2 3 4 (highest) Market (SPI) Risk free
Average annual return 0.1170 0.1004 0.0953 0.0471 0.0720 0.0071
Average annual excess return 0.1099 0.0933 0.0882 0.0400 0.0649
Value of CHF 1 Mio after 11-year 
holding period
3'378'014 2'865'160 2'720'499 1'659'219   2'147'560     
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5.2 Risk-adjusted Performance of the P/E Portfolios 
As already mentioned in the method of analysis, the performance figures needed for the 
risk-adjusted measurement of performance are based on different approaches of 
calculation than the absolute performance calculation. 
The lowest P/E portfolio (portfolio 1) earned the highest average annual return 
of 12.7%. Portfolio 2 and 3 had a similar profitability of 10.7% and 10.2%, respectively. 
Portfolio 4 achieved the lowest return, yielding roughly half of the portfolios 2 and 3. 
The market, in comparison, earned an average of 7.8% per annum, meaning that only 
portfolio 4 was unable to outperform the market. As anticipated, portfolios 1-3 clearly 
outperformed the Swiss Performance Index. In summary, table 3 illustrates that average 
annual rates of return are higher for low P/E portfolios and lower for high P/E 
portfolios. 
The rates of return of the higher yielding portfolios did not always correlate with 
higher levels of total risk (𝜎p). Specifically, the low return portfolio 4 had the second 
highest standard deviation of 0.153. By contrast, the higher return portfolios 2 and 3 had 
a lower standard deviation of 0.1442 and 0.1439, respectively. As one might expect, the 
highest return portfolio 1 had the highest standard deviation (0.1773), whilst the market 
had the lowest (0.1313). 
Contrary to the capital market theory, the higher portfolio returns neither always 
correlated with higher levels of systematic risk (βp); the systematic risks of portfolio 2 
(0.9368) and 3 (0.9326) were lower than the one of portfolio 4 (0.9587). On the other 
hand, consistent with the capital market theory, the highest yielding portfolio was 
associated with the highest level of systematic risk. 
 
Table 3: Risk-adjusted performance measures 
Consistent with the risk-return relationships, there are significant differences 
between the scores of the four portfolios obtained using the Sharpe and Treynor ratio. In 
1 (lowest) 2 3 4 (highest) Market (SPI)
Average annual return (R p ) 0.1269 0.1066 0.1017 0.0581 0.0783
Average annual excess return (R' p ) 0.1197 0.0994 0.0946 0.0509 0.0712
Total risk (σ p ) 0.1773 0.1442 0.1439 0.1530 0.1313
Systematic risk (β p ) 1.1289 0.9369 0.9326 0.9587 1.0000
Sharpe ratio (S p ) 0.6752 0.6894 0.6576 0.3328 0.5422
Treynor ratio (T p ) 0.1061 0.1061 0.1014 0.0531 0.0712
Jensen's alpha (α p ) 0.0394 0.0327 0.0282 -0.0173
Coefficient of correlation: ρ(Rp,Rm) 0.8359 0.8529 0.8512 0.8225
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terms of the Sharpe ratio, portfolios 1 and 2, with values of approximately 0.68 and 0.69 
had the highest risk premium per level of total risk, followed by portfolio 3 with a ratio 
of approximately 0.66. Portfolio 4 was the lowest ranked portfolio, with a Sharpe ratio 
of 0.33. Moreover, all portfolios beside portfolio 4 had ratios higher than the Swiss 
Performance Index (0.54). Consequently, the Sharpe ratio shows that the performance 
of the low P/E portfolios is superior to that of their high ratio competitors. Similar 
results were found in terms of the Treynor ratio. Whereas portfolios 1, 2 and 3 were 
ranked above the market, portfolio 4 had a ratio below the market. Interestingly, 
portfolio 2 attained a higher value than portfolio 1, but when comparing return and total 
risk, the two portfolios indicate equality with regard to return and systematic risk.  
A comparison of Jensen’s alpha shows a broadly similar ranking as with the 
Sharpe and Treynor ratio. With exception to portfolio 4, each portfolio earned rates 
higher than implied by their levels of risk. The results indicate that, if we ignore tax 
effects regarding dividends and capital gains, the two low P/E portfolios, 1 and 2, as 
well as portfolio 3, earned about 4%, 3.3% and 2.8% per annum more than implied by 
their levels of risk. Meanwhile the high P/E portfolio 4 earned 1.7% per annum less than 
implied by its level of risk. Figure 3 demonstrates a comparison of the portfolios 
between the average annual excess returns and the corresponding alphas. 
 
 Figure 3: Return comparison (2005-2015) 
Finally, the quality of the regression results is reasonably good. The Swiss 
Performance Index as an explanatory variable was significant for all the portfolios and 
the correlation coefficients ranged between 0.82 and 0.85. 
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5.2.1 Pre- and Post-Financial Crisis 
To pinpoint differences between the time before and the time after the crash, the 
investigation was split into two sections: (i) a pre-financial crisis, 2005-2007 and (ii) a 
post-financial crisis, 2008-2015. 
 
Pre-financial crisis 
As demonstrated in table 4, the sustained increase of the share prices and the associated 
high return figures confirm the existence of a bull market between 2005 and 2007. 
Firstly, portfolios 1, 2 and 3 earned similar average annual returns of around 
22%. With 20% portfolio 4 yielded only a slightly lower annual return than the other 
portfolios. The market, in comparison, earned 17% per annum, which is significantly 
less than all of the four portfolios formed according to their P/E ratios. The hypothesis 
of higher average annual rates of return for low P/E portfolios is not clearly confirmed 
during the bull market from 2005 to 2007, because portfolio 3 also achieved a 
comparably high return. 
Secondly, there are differences in total risk levels (𝜎p). Although portfolio 2 
earned the highest average annual return, it was associated with the lowest total risk of 
0.1022, whereas the lowest P/E portfolio, yielding only the third highest return, was 
associated with the highest standard deviation (0.1339) of the four portfolios. As might 
be expected, the market had the lowest standard deviation with a score of 0.0991. 
Thirdly, just as for the entire timespan, the higher portfolio returns did not 
always correlate with higher levels of systematic risk (βp). Only portfolio 1 had a beta 
greater than 1, indicating a 4% higher volatility than the market. Despite posing higher 
risks than the rest, portfolio 1 was not able to offer a higher rate of return. The 
volatilities of the other portfolios were all clearly below the market. It is interesting to 
note that, against the rules of the capital market theory, the highest yielding portfolio 2 
showed the smallest beta score, implying a volatility of 20% less than the market. 
The Performance of SPI Stocks in Relation to their P/E Ratios 
27 
 
Table 4: Risk-adjusted performance measures (pre-financial crisis) 
Fourthly, the risk/return combined single measures Sharpe ratio and Treynor 
ratio allow a better comparison than the two-parameter measure of performance. The 
Sharpe ratio shows the logical consequence of the findings discussed in the above two 
paragraphs. Portfolio 2 exposed the highest risk premium per level of total risk with a 
value of 2.05, followed by portfolio 3 (1.81) and portfolio 4 (1.63). Remarkable is that 
in this case portfolio 1 (1.54) achieved the lowest Sharpe ratio. Finally, it is almost 
equal to the market. In terms of the Treynor ratio, the ranking of the portfolios is 
identical for the Sharpe ratio, with the sole difference that portfolio 1 was better off than 
the Swiss Performance Index. This can notably be explained by the high return of 
portfolio 1 compared to its comparatively small beta.  
Fifthly, all four portfolios were able to generate a positive alpha. This means that 
all portfolios earned higher rates of return than implied by their levels of risk. While 
portfolio 2 and 3 earned almost 9% and 7% per annum respectively more than implied 
by their levels of risk, portfolio 1 and 4 earned about 5% more than implied by their 
levels of risk. Figure 4 depicts a comparison of the portfolios between the average 
annual excess returns and the corresponding alphas within the pre-financial crisis. 
 
 Figure 4: Return comparison (pre fin-crisis) 
1 (lowest) 2 3 4 (highest) Market (SPI)
Average annual return (R p ) 0.2239 0.2277 0.2272 0.2047 0.1698
Average annual excess return (R' p ) 0.2061 0.2098 0.2093 0.1868 0.1520
Total risk (σ p ) 0.1339 0.1022 0.1156 0.1141 0.0991
Systematic risk (β p ) 1.0412 0.7917 0.9178 0.9160 1.0000
Sharpe ratio (S p ) 1.5391 2.0527 1.8108 1.6368 1.5337
Treynor ratio (T p ) 0.1979 0.2650 0.2280 0.2039 0.1520
Jensen's alpha (α p ) 0.0478 0.0895 0.0698 0.0476
Coefficient of correlation: ρ(Rp,Rm) 0.7706 0.7674 0.7868 0.7954
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Lastly, the correlations with the market are lower compared to the timeframe 
2005-2015. Coefficients of correlation for the monthly returns in the pre-financial crisis 
2005-2007 ranged between 0.76 and 0.80. 
 
Post-financial crisis 
In 2008 the worldwide financial crisis put an end to the bull market. As investors 
anticipated losses and started selling stocks, the share prices declined sharply. This can 
be considered as the typical entry into a bear market. Most affected from this bear 
market were the cyclical stocks, being imploded up until the end of the investigation 
period. Table 5 gives clarification about the performance effects of the crisis and the 
subsequent recovery. 
Firstly, despite the significant losses in 2008 and 2011, all four portfolios earned 
positive average annuals returns. Particularly the lowest P/E portfolio turns out to be the 
by far most successful portfolio. With an average rate of return of 9% it generated 3% 
higher returns than all the other portfolios. Similar to the timespan 2005-2015, the 
returns declined as the P/E ratios of the portfolios rose. Furthermore, only portfolio 4 
was unable to outperform the market.  
Secondly, the higher returns were associated with higher levels of total risk (𝜎p) 
for portfolio 1, 2 and 3. Portfolio 4 on the other hand showed the second highest total 
risk combined with the lowest rate of return. The market once again implied the lowest 
standard deviation.  
Thirdly, the levels of systematic risk (βp) behaved very similar to the total risk 
component. As expected, portfolio 1 exhibits a beta greater than 1, and is 14% more 
volatile than the market. As before the crisis, the volatilities of the other portfolios were 
all clearly below the market. Whereas portfolio 2 and 4 have a similar market risk, 
portfolio 3 has the lowest beta of the portfolios. 
 
Table 5: Risk-adjusted performance measures (post-financial crisis) 
1 (lowest) 2 3 4 (highest) Market (SPI)
Average annual return (R p ) 0.0905 0.0611 0.0547 0.0031 0.0440
Average annual excess return (R' p ) 0.0874 0.0580 0.0516 0.0000 0.0409
Total risk (σ p ) 0.1906 0.1555 0.1514 0.1630 0.1407
Systematic risk (β p ) 1.1462 0.9563 0.9273 0.9546 1.0000
Sharpe ratio (S p ) 0.4582 0.3730 0.3407 -0.0001 0.2907
Treynor ratio (T p ) 0.0762 0.0607 0.0556 0.0000 0.0409
Jensen's alpha (α p ) 0.0405 0.0189 0.0137 -0.0391 0.0000
Coefficient of correlation: ρ(Rp,Rm) 0.8458 0.8649 0.8614 0.8240
The Performance of SPI Stocks in Relation to their P/E Ratios 
29 
Fourthly, the Sharpe ratios of the portfolios were in accordance to their average 
annual returns. Whereas portfolio 1 displayed a value of 0.46 and the highest risk 
premium per level of total risk, portfolio 2 and 3 were next in rank with values of 0.37 
and 0.34. Due to the extremely low rate of return of portfolio 4, the Sharpe ratio is close 
to zero. Thus, it makes an investment greatly unattractive. The market with a value of 
0.29 positions itself better than portfolio 4 but worse than the other 3 remaining 
portfolios. As in the full time period under investigation, the Sharpe ratio shows a 
superior performance of the low P/E portfolios to that of their high ratio counterparts. 
The same holds true for the Treynor ratios. The numbers fall, the higher the P/E ratios 
get. Similar to the Sharpe ratio, portfolio 4 is rated lower than the market.  
Fifthly, a comparison of Jensen’s alpha shows the same ranking as with the 
Sharpe and Treynor ratios. With the exception of portfolio 4, all portfolios earned rates 
higher than implied by their levels of risk, with P/E portfolio 1 earning the highest. 
Figure 5 displays a comparison of the portfolios between the average annual excess 
returns and the corresponding alphas within the post-financial crisis. 
 
 Figure 5: Return comparison (post fin-crisis) 
At last, the portfolios of the post-financial crisis time frame exhibit the strongest 
overall correlation with the market. Coefficients of correlation for the monthly returns 
in the post-financial crisis 2008-2015 ranged between 0.82 and 0.87 
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5.3 Discussion of the Findings 
It has been found that between 2005 and 2015, stocks with low P/E ratios earned higher 
absolute and risk-adjusted (testing Sharpe- and Treynor ratio as well as Jensen’s alpha) 
returns than stocks with high P/E ratio. Furthermore, low P/E portfolios were able to 
generate excess returns compared to the market. These findings underline the results of 
previous studies in the USA as well as in the rest of the world, but contradict the results 
of Banz and Reinganum, who documented abnormally large risk-adjusted returns for 
higher P/E ratios (growth stocks). The risk-return relationships within the porfolios 
confirm the approach of Fama and French and Ball and Kothari, with the exception of 
portfolio 4. Whereas the lowest P/E portfolio showed highest total- and systematic risk, 
the risk decreased as the P/E ratios rose, with the exception of the highest P/E portfolio 
(portfolio 4), which revealed the second highest total- and systematic risk.  
The return results of the pre-financial crisis timeframe from 2005 to 2007 do not 
exactly confirm the vast majority of literature, since the low P/E portfolios did not earn 
higher absolute nor higher risk-adjusted returns than the high P/E portfolios. According 
to Dreman’s advice that the strategy should only be used for a long time horizon (in 
good and bad market situations), it may be concluded that the time frame was too short. 
Albeit, it has been proved that all of the four portfolios performed extremely well, and 
surpassed the market significantly. Fama and French’s and Ball and Kothari’s 
assumption that higher returns of value stocks are due to higher risks, was disproved by 
portfolio 2, combining the highest return with the lowest total- and systematic risk. On 
the other hand,  portfolio 1 implied the highest total- and systematic risk performing 
only third best. 
The 8 years of the post-financial crisis section once again confirm the great 
majority of the literature, since stocks with low P/E ratios earned higher absolute and 
risk-adjusted returns (proven by all of the three risk-adjusted performance measures) 
than stocks with high P/E ratios. Moreover, the three lowest P/E portfolios 
outperformed the market. In contrast to Dreman’s assertion that this strategy does well 
neither in turbulent markets nor in periods of slow economic growth, this paper shows 
that the opposite is the case. Equally to the overall period being observed, and in line 
with Fama and French’s and Ball and Kothari’s expectations, the risk fell continually as 
the P/E ratios increased, excluding the highest P/E portfolio (portfolio 4), which showed 
the second highest total- and systematic risk.  
The Performance of SPI Stocks in Relation to their P/E Ratios 
31 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper an effort was made to determine the relationship between the investment 
performances of equity securities and their P/E ratios. Whereas the efficient market 
hypothesis denies a relationship between P/E ratios and subsequent returns, and also the 
associated possibility of earnings excess returns, the P/E ratio hypothesis asserts that 
P/E ratios may be indicators of future investment performance. 
During the 11-year period under investigation (2005–2015) the low P/E 
portfolios earned higher average absolute and risk-adjusted rates of return (considering 
total- and systematic risk) than the high P/E portfolios. Furthermore, low P/E portfolios 
were able to generate significant excess returns compared to the market. Over the entire 
time horizon, the average yearly excess return on the lowest P/E portfolio was 4.0 
percent higher than the average return suggested by its systematic risk level, whereas 
the highest P/E portfolio showed 1.7 percent less average yearly excess return than that 
implied by its beta risk. While the price/earnings ratio hypothesis is not fully confirmed 
by the pre-financial crisis section, the post-financial crisis section does underline the 
higher absolute and risk-adjusted returns of the low P/E portfolios. Nonetheless, the low 
P/E portfolios managed to outperform the market significantly in both sections. 
The empirical finding that the intercepts of the CAPM deviate statistically from 
zero suggest a violation of the joint hypothesis, meaning that either the risk adjustment 
procedure of the CAPM has failed or the behavior of the security prices were not 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. While the CAPM was chosen 
deliberately because of the assumption that it assesses its risk correctly, the asset pricing 
model can be seen as valid. 
Therefore, the findings of this paper suggest that P/E ratio information was not 
“fully reflected” in security prices as postulated by the efficient market hypothesis. 
Instead, the period studied suggests a disequilibria in capital markets, proposing that the 
securities considered seem to have been inappropriately priced, and opportunities for 
earning “abnormal” returns were afforded to investors. Active investors, convinced of 
the existence of inefficient markets, have been proved right and could have taken 
advantage of the market disequilibria by purchasing low P/E stocks on an annual basis.  
However, despite the assumption of a correct risk adjustment procedure of the 
CAPM, it is not 100% clear if the superior returns in the 11-year period studied are 
really due to inappropriately priced securities. Nevertheless, the “P/E effect” seems to 
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exist for stocks within the Swiss Performance Index during the period 2005-2015, and 
therefore the price/earnings ratio hypothesis is considered as validated. Moreover, the 
findings underline that the P/E ratio hypothesis is confirmed even in a persistent low- or 
zero-interest environment, during times of turbulent markets and in periods of slow 
economic growth. Finally, it must be added that the strategy has shown best results 
when used over a long time horizon, during good and bad market situations. 
 
6.1 Limitations of this Paper 
This work only focused on P/E ratio as valuation measure to determine whether value 
stocks are able to outperform growth stocks in the Swiss stock market. Further ratios as 
market-to-book or price-to-cash flow, which have attracted much attention in the 
literature of security valuation, have not been taken into consideration. In addition, the 
data sample does not represent the market entirely, as only the 100 highest capitalized 
companies of the Swiss Performance Index have been considered. Furthermore the pre-
financial crisis section was limited to three years return data which is a comparatively 
short timespan for significant assertions. This might have led to the fact that the pre-
crisis returns turned out to be unusually high. Moreover, this paper did only make use of 
the Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to measure risk-adjusted 
performance. An attempt to assign the derivations from CAPM to missing risk factors 
by using other risk-based models, such as multifactor asset pricing models, was not 
made. 
 
6.2 Outlook 
This paper presents evidence that value stocks selected by low P/E ratios are able to 
generate excess returns in the Swiss stock market. Therefore, additional ratios in the 
context of value strategies in the Swiss Performance Index could be further analyzed. 
Furthermore, the timeframe of data collection before the financial crisis might be 
expanded to generate more valid return figures. Finally, additional factors could be 
introduced to examine if missing risk factors are the source of the deviations from 
CAPM. 
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8 Appendix 
 
Figure 6: Yearly average P/E ratios of the four P/E portfolios 
 
Figure 7: Sector breakdown 2005 
 
Figure 8: Sector breakdown 2006 
 
Figure 9: Sector breakdown 2007 
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Figure 10: Sector breakdown 2008 
 
Figure 11: Sector breakdown 2009 
 
Figure 12: Sector breakdown 2010 
 
Figure 13: Sector breakdown 2011 
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Figure 14: Sector breakdown 2012 
 
Figure 15: Sector breakdown 2013 
 
Figure 16: Sector breakdown 2014 
 
Figure 17: Sector breakdown 2015 
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